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Abstract 
The agency costs hypothesis argues that firms include warrants in their IPOs to bind 
managers to optimal investment decisions, while the signalling hypothesis considers 
that those firms are riskier and expects higher returns than from other firms that do not 
include warrants in order to compensate the investors’ extra risks. Thus, this study tests 
the extent to which the agency costs and signaling models explain the reason for the 
issuance of IPOs with warrants in the United Kingdom between 2000 and 2011. 
Analyzing a sample with fifty-six companies of which twenty-three issued IPOs with 
warrants while the other thirty-three issued IPOs without warrants, we conclude that 
most firms that used warrants in their IPOs are from the mining and manufacturing 
industries, followed by finance, insurance and real estate. The firms that issued IPOs 
without warrants during this period have the same SIC code as firms that used warrants. 
Contributing for filling in a gap in literature through the use of the long-term price 
performance approach, we analyze the performance of these firms comparing with firms 
that issued IPOs without warrants. All results were compared with the returns of a 
market index and a set of control non-IPOs firms, listed in the United Kingdom Stock 
Exchanges and matched on both size-and-book-to-market ratio and industry-size-and-
book-to-market-ratio. Despite the event-study analysis present results that do not 
corroborate totally the agency costs and signaling models, in matched calendar-time 
regressions the performance of IPOs with warrants is better than that of IPOs without 
warrants when based in direct comparison of value-weighted portfolios. So, these 
results meet the prediction of the agency costs and signaling theories. Thus, this study 
launches again the discussion around this topic and reveals that, although this theme has 
been little studied, it cannot be completely disregarded. 
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1. Introduction 
In order to raise funds for business expansion and investment, many companies choose 
to go to the market in the form of public offerings. With the development of financial 
markets, some initial public offerings (IPOs) have been including warrants and not only 
the traditionally common or preferred stocks. “This method consists of a bundle of 
common stocks and warrants, sold together as a package, but traded separately in the 
aftermarket” (Gajewski et al., 2007, p. 25). However, this method is debatable. 
“Practitioners often regard IPOs with warrants as “sweeteners” used to boost weak 
demand for low quality offerings. Academics argue that the practitioners’ view is 
unsatisfactory” (Mazouz et al., 2008a, p. 210). For academics this method originates a 
sequential financing that can ensure investors a lower probability of excess free cash 
flow being squander in negative net present value projects (Schultz, 1993). In the same 
way, it can be used to signal the issuers’ confidence in their future performance because 
the second stage financing is conditional on stock price appreciation (Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri, 1997). So, according to the agency costs hypothesis, firms include warrants in 
their IPOs to bind managers to optimal investment decisions, while the signalling 
hypothesis expects that firms that use warrants in their IPOs are riskier than firms that 
not use warrants. This originates expected higher returns to compensate the investors’ 
extra risks. 
However, it is yet complicated to argue that returns are higher as suggested by theory, 
because this topic has received little attention from the finance literature. The existing 
studies have been focusing on reasons for firms to use warrants in IPOs, testing the 
agency costs and signaling hypothesis. The study of Mazouz et al. (2008a) was the only 
to test the extent to which the agency costs and signaling models explain the reason for 
IPOs with warrants issuance using the long-term price performance approach. Filling in 
a gap in the empirical literature and analyzing IPOs with warrants in the Hong-Kong 
Stock Exchange from 1990 to 2002, they conclude that their long-term price 
performance rejects the predictions of both models. Not contesting their results we think 
that their conclusion cannot be assumed as entirely feasible, once the prices of listed 
firms and their respective performance can be influenced by external factors not directly 
connected with the firms but with the markets’ momentum and consequent investment 
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of shareholders in products sometimes unknown. So, it is relevant to analyze new 
markets, hoping to get results, which can corroborate or refute the existing findings. 
Following the same methodology of Mazouz et al. (2008a) we will test the extent to 
which the agency costs and signaling models explain the reasons for the issuance of 
IPOs with warrants in the United Kingdom from 2000 to 2011. So, we will study a 
sample with fifty-six companies of which twenty-three issued IPOs with warrants while 
the other thirty-three issued IPOs without warrants. Most firms that used warrants in 
their IPOs are from the mining and manufacturing industries, followed by finance, 
insurance and real estate. The firms that issued IPOs without warrants during this period 
have the same SIC Code as firms that used warrants.  
Analyzing a market for so long removed from this topic, we will also try to obtain 
answers about the type of firms that are more likely to use warrants in IPOs. To obtain 
these results, we used a descriptive analysis of our sample, distributing firms by deciles 
and comparing with other previous studies. After that, we used the event-study analysis 
of abnormal returns and the calendar-time regressions of Fama (1998). For robustness 
purposes and following previous studies, we will systematically compare the obtained 
returns to a set of control firms matched on both size and book-to-market ratio and 
industry-size-and-book-to-market ratio. 
The results obtained reveal that the type of firms using warrants in their IPOs have been 
changing. Nowadays, there are larger companies using warrants to signal their value 
and increase the raise of capital in initial public offerings. Some of these companies are 
directly connected with areas of activity in which future cash flows are uncertain, like 
mining. On the other hand, the performance of these companies according to the event-
study analysis underperform the firms that issued IPOs without warrants, revealing 
results consistent with the agency costs and signaling models. The results of calendar-
time regression follow the same trend. However, in matched calendar-time regressions 
the performance of IPOs with warrants is better than that of IPOs without warrants 
when based in direct comparison of value-weighted portfolios. More conclusively we 
can argue that the results obtained show some evidence that supports the agency costs 
and signaling hypotheses.  
This way, we are the first study supporting partially the agency costs and signaling 
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models, analyzing a new market with more recent data. Using the long-term price 
performance approach, we also do a more specific analysis based only on companies 
from the same industry, hoping not to get skewed results. More importantly, this study 
launches again the discussion around this topic.  
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows: section 2 presents the 
literature review, including the main theory that explains the use of warrants in IPOs 
and the main empirical studies about the long-term performance of firms that issue IPOs 
with warrants; section 3 contains the data description and the control samples that we 
used in our analysis; in section 4, the methodology and the empirical results are 
presented; finally, section 5 includes the main conclusions and is followed by the 
bibliography and the appendix parts. 
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2. Literature review 
In this section we analyze the agency costs and signaling hypotheses and present the 
results of the main empirical studies that test the predictions of these hypotheses. We 
also present the scarce empirical studies that analyzed the long-term performance of 
equity offerings with warrants. 
2.1. Agency costs hypothesis 
When a firm issues IPOs with warrants, equity is expected to be used to finance 
investments with positive net present value. However, if investors, normally out of the 
firm management, cannot determine the real value of potential investments, they may be 
reluctant to subscribe any equity offering. They are before the potential risk of free 
cash-flow, which states that remaining funds from IPOs can be squandered by managers 
on projects with negative net present value for their own personal benefit, particularly 
when ownership is dispersed and the firm’s monitoring is reduced (Jensen, 1986). 
Motivated by this hypothesis, Schultz (1993) illustrates that warrants in IPOs can be 
used to limit the agency costs, arguing that IPOs with warrants serve the same purpose 
as staged equity financing in venture capital. Providing equity financing in stages, the 
use of warrants in IPOs encourages managers to make optimal investment decisions for 
the firm, once the success of financing in stages is dependent on their decisions. Thus, 
the second step of financing only happens if the managers choose high value projects 
where the stock price will exceed the warrant exercise price, and warrant holders will 
certainly obtain a profit exercising these warrants. In addition, this prevents firms from 
selling shares in a second round of equity financing without first determining the 
value of their projects, providing, thus, a constant analysis and dissemination of 
project results.  
The agency costs hypothesis leads to several testable predictions. “First, because the 
initial public offering with warrants proceeds are used to determine the viability of 
potential investments, many firms will prove to have no positive net present value 
investment” (Schultz, 1993, p. 205). Thus, a small group of firms that use warrants in 
their IPOs survive. Second, “the firms that can survive will be more likely to receive 
additional equity” (Schultz, 1993, p. 205). Third, the firms that issue IPOs with warrants 
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“are more likely to issue initial public offerings with warrants if their prospects are 
difficult to evaluate on the basis of the current available information” (Schultz, 1993, p. 
205), suggesting that these firms have a “short operation background, sophisticated 
products and little sales, earnings or assets” (Schultz, 1993, p. 205). Fourth, the IPOs 
with warrants are used when managers own a small portion of the firm’s equity and 
thus, if they make bad investments, the costs will be lower.  
Consistent with these predictions, Schultz (1993) shows that most firms that issue 
warrants in initial public offerings are also smaller, younger and mainly from high-tech 
or services industries. In the same way these firms tend to have more agency costs and 
are more risky and more likely to fail than those issuing shares alone. However, Jain 
(1994), Lee et al. (2003) and How and Howe (2001) find that the probability of failure 
is independent of whether the IPOs are issued with warrants or not, when firms have 
similar characteristics.  
2.2. Signalling hypothesis 
Based on a pioneer study of Leland and Pyle (1977),  Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) 
propose a signalling model, which requires the interaction of asymmetric information 
and managers’ risk aversion. “Their model allows for the firms to differ in both the 
mean and the riskiness of their future cash flows. At time 0, the firms` insiders know the 
true mean and the variance of the future cash flows, but they do not know the exact 
value that will occur at time 1” (Gajewski et al., 2007, p. 29). Thus, the good firms can 
use three signals to distinguish themselves from the bad firms: the fraction of equity 
retained, the degree of underpricing and the number of warrants. All signals are costly 
for the firm, whereby firm insiders will choose the signal that maximize their utility, or 
equivalently, minimize signalling costs. Thus, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) have 
demonstrated that, in equilibrium, high risk firms package their equity with warrants 
while lower risk firms issue equity alone. 
Their model also provides several testable predictions. First, in a group of firms that are 
indistinguishable prior to the initial public offering, the subset of firms that employ 
warrants will have a greater variability of future cash flows compared to those that have 
made initial public offerings with equity alone. Second, the proportion of the firm’s 
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value sold as warrant increases with the level of the IPO firm riskiness, holding constant 
the fraction of equity retained by insiders. Third, the percentage of underpricing 
increases with the firm’s riskiness, regardless of the type of IPO. Fourth, in IPOs with 
warrants, the fraction of equity retained by firm insiders decreases according to the 
firm’s riskiness, keeping constant the proportion of the firm sold as warrant. 
Empirically, Schultz (1993) offers a strong conclusion that supports the greater 
variability of future cash-flows from firms that issue IPOs with warrants compared with 
firms that issue IPOs without warrants. Analysing data from firms that issued initial 
public offerings in the Australian Stock Exchange, How and Howe (2001) provide 
results that support the Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) predictions. They find that 
firms that issue IPOs with warrants are more risky than firms that do not include 
warrants in IPOs, while the level of underpricing increases with this risk. After 
controlling the equity retained by insiders, the proportion of firm value sold as warrant 
increases with firm riskiness. Similar results are found by Lee et al. (2003) for 
Australian IPOs and by Jain (1994) for US IPOs. However, comparing IPOs with 
warrants, Garner and Marshall (2005) conclude that this riskiness is not uniform across 
all IPOs. They conclude that companies with longer warrant exercise periods and a 
lower ratio of shares to warrants are riskier. Analyzing the Chinese IPOs listed in the 
Hong-Kong Stock Exchange, Mazouz et al. (2008b) also obtained results that support 
the signaling model. However and using other model of analysis based on the long-term 
price performance approach, Mazouz et al. (2008a) rejects the prediction of agency 
costs and signaling models. 
The predictions of the signaling model were also tested in other types of equity 
offerings like seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Byoun and Moore (2003) support the 
signaling predictions for US SEOs, while Chollet and Ginglinger (2001) show that in 
France, SEOs are likely to be offered by firms that face high information asymmetry. 
2.3. Performance of equity offerings with warrants 
In an efficient market setting, the use of warrants in equity offerings should not provide 
any advantage to the issuing firm. However, the theories about this topic are based on 
the assumption of asymmetric information between insider and outsider investors. 
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Therefore, and considering also this assumption, the average long-term performance of 
offerings with warrants must be greater than that of offerings only with shares, to make 
up for the higher risk undertaken. This prediction is consistent with the Schultz (1993) 
and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) models, once the firms are riskier, and for these 
level of risk high quality firms use warrants in their equity offerings to signal their 
quality. So, we can consider that the post-issue long-term performance of equity 
offerings with warrants is related with the significance of agency costs and asymmetric 
information problems in public offerings. 
The empirical results show that long-term stock price performance of equity offerings 
with warrants is not consistent with the implications of the theories above explained, in 
spite of the evidence of less severe price reaction to announcements compared with 
equity offerings with shares only. Consistent with this conclusion, Lee (1997) shows 
that SEOs with warrants underperform the SEOs without warrants. This 
underperformance is robust to other alternative specifications based on various firm 
and/or offerings characteristics. Byoun (2004) measure the long-term price performance 
by selecting matched firms according to various firm caractherisicts and comparing 
them with firms that used warrants in their SEOs. They also find that, in general, the 
long-term stock performance of SEOs with warrants underperform not only the prior 
returns of non-issuing, size-and-book-to-market ratio matched firms but also similar 
SEOs without warrants. The same resuls are found when the long-term performance is 
compared with a market index or measured by the three-factor or four-factor model. 
Their conclusions are consistent with previous studies of Ritter (1991), Levis (1993); 
Loughran and Ritter (1995)  and Jegadeesh (2000) that show that, on average, the post-
issue long-term holding period stock price returns of issuing firms are lower than their 
matched firms and benchmarks. 
Mazouz et al. (2008a) test the extent to which the agency costs and signaling models 
explain the reasons to include warrants in IPOs using the long-term price performance 
approach. They conclude that initial public offerings with warrants have higher 
profitability and better asset utilization rates compared with initial public offerings 
without warrants. However, the event-time average cumulative abnormal returns and 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns suggest that IPOs with warrants underperform 
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significantly the IPOs without warrants in the long term. Given the potential problems 
associated with the use of the event-time approach, they employ the matched calendar-
time regression methodology. Also, under the matched calendar-time regression 
approach, they do not find any evidence that IPOs with warrants performed better than 
IPOs without warrants. Basically, these findings are not consistent with theories that 
explain the use of warrants in equity offerings as mechanisms of reducing agency costs 
or of signaling firms future cash-flows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 9 
3. Data description and control samples 
In this section we present our sample and explain how data was obtained, followed by a 
descriptive analysis. We also present a control samples, used to test the robustness of 
our sample. 
3.1. Sample selection and data description 
We analyze a sample of twenty-three IPOs with warrants and thirty-three IPOs without 
warrants issued in the United Kingdom from January 2000 to December 2011. The data 
were collected from Zephyr database and the subset of twenty-three IPOs with warrants 
was selected from a total of sixty-four IPOs with warrants issued in the European Union 
in the period above mentioned. Consistent with the prior literature, we excluded from 
the sample the close-end funds, investment trusts, acquisition vehicles and blank check 
companies and companies with missing data. Finally we excluded an IPO with warrants 
issued in the Cyprus Stock Exchange, once the introduction of different currencies in 
our analysis could bring errors related with the impossibility to eliminate the effect of 
the exchange rate that would be used to convert the values of this firm to pounds. After 
that, we selected the IPOs with warrants following a new criterion based on the only 
selection of IPOs without warrants that have the same SIC Codes 1  of IPOs with 
warrants. So, we distance ourselves from the study of Mazouz et al. (2008a) that 
analyzed all IPOs without warrants issued in the Hong-Kong Stock Exchange regardless 
if they were connected with the SIC Codes of IPOs with warrants or not. The offering 
information was obtained from the description of IPOs in the Zephyr database, while 
equity prices and market value and book to market ratio of firms were obtained from 
Datastream. The frequency distribution of all IPOs, over the sample period, is presented 
in table 1.2  
The total number of IPOs with warrants is rather small and below the number of IPOs 
without warrants. The difference between IPOs with warrants and IPOs without 
warrants is not a surprise, and follows the trend already mentioned in other studies, 
namely How and Howe (2001), Lee et al. (2003) and Mazouz et al. (2008a). However, 
                                                        
1Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are four-digit numerical codes assigned by the U.S. 
government to business establishments to identify the primary business of the establishment. 
2 A graph with the distribution of sample is in appendix 1. 
 10 
the size of our sample is much smaller than the samples already studied. This reveals 
the differences on the use of warrants in IPOs around world. This procedure is more 
usual in countries like the United States, Australia and Hong-Kong, whereby almost all 
studies refer to the stock exchanges from these countries. These stock exchanges have 
more liquidity and a significant number of transactions. However, the volume of IPOs 
with warrants has been decreasing in the last years, coinciding with the regulatory 
changes in some countries.  
Table 1 - Distribution of the sample, 2000-2011. 
Year IPOs with warrants IPOs without warrants All IPOs 
2000 0 8 8 
2001 0 1 1 
2002 2 1 3 
2003 2 1 3 
2004 5 4 9 
2005 5 7 12 
2006 7 3 10 
2007 0 4 4 
2008 1 0 1 
2010 1 4 5 
2011 0 0 0 
2000-2011 23 33 56 
The table lists the number of firms that went public on United Kingdom during 2000-2011 by 
the issue year and issue type. 
For example, in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange listing requirements, which became 
effective from September 15, 1994, the objective of the new regulation is to screen out a 
subset of poor IPO performers (Mazouz et al., 2008a). It is therefore possible to argue 
that the high quality of information associated with the newly introduced regulations 
should enable investors to better discriminate between high-and low-quality issuers. In 
our study, the number of IPOs with warrants increased consistently from 2002 to 2006, 
year with more IPOs with warrants listed. Curiously, after that, the number of IPOs with 
warrants decreased again, and there were no IPOs with warrants in the years of 2007 
and 2011. The numbers of IPOs without warrants were more inconstant but with special 
incidence between 2004 and 2006, like the IPOs with warrants. Once we are analyzing 
IPOs with the same SIC code, we can conclude that the preference of companies to 
issue IPOs without warrants is much greater. 
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Table 2 summarizes the size and book-to-market rankings of the firms that issued IPOs 
as of the listing month, as well as their industry distribution. In the size ranking, for 
each month, we rank firms by their market value, which is calculated as the share price 
multiplied by the number of ordinary shares, at the beginning of the month, placing 
them into deciles.   
 
Table 2 - Size, book-to-market and industry distribution of the sample firms. 
 IPOs with warrants IPOs without warrants All IPOs 
 Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) 
Panel A: Size       
Decile 1-2 6 (26,09%) 5 (15,15%) 11 (19,64%) 
Decile 3-4 3 (13,04%) 8 (24,24%) 11 (19,64%) 
Decile 5-6 4 (17,39%) 8 (24,24%) 12 (21,43%) 
Decile 7-10 10 (43,48%) 12 (36,36%) 22 (39,29%) 
Panel B: M/B       
Decile 1-2 4 (17,39%) 8 (24,24%) 12 (21,43%) 
Decile 3-4 8 (34,78%) 3 (9,09%) 11 (19,64%) 
Decile 5-6 3 (13,04%) 7 (21,21%) 10 (17,86%) 
Decile 7-10 8 (34,78%) 15 (45,45%) 23 (41,07%) 
Panel C: Industry       
Mining 11 (47,83%) 3 (9,09%) 14 (25,00%) 
Manufacturing  
 
5 (21,74%) 3 (9,09%) 8 (14,29%) 
Finance, insurance 
and real estate 
4 (17,39%) 2 (6,06%) 6 (10,71%) 
Services 2 (8,70%) 25 (75,76%) 27 (48,21%) 
Transportation and 
public utilities 
1 (4,35%) 0 (0,00%) 1 (1,79%) 
This table describes the size, book-to-market and industry distribution of the sample firms. In 
the size ranking, for each month, we rank firms by their market value, placing them into deciles.  
Following the same method, in book-to-market ranking, for each month, we rank firms by their 
book-to-market ratios, placing then into deciles. In industry ranking firms each firms is assigned 
to one industry using primary SIC codes. Market value is the share price multiplied by the 
number of ordinary shares in issue based on the first month available market capitalization on 
the Datastream, after the offering date. Book to market ratio is defined as the balance sheet 
value of the ordinary (common) equity divided by the market value of the ordinary (common) 
equity in the company. 
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Following the same method, in the book-to-market ranking, for each month, we rank 
firms by their book-to-market ratio, which is defined as the market value of the ordinary 
(common) equity divided by the balance sheet value of the ordinary (common) equity in 
the company, placing them into deciles. In industry ranking firms, each firm is assigned 
to one industry using primary SIC codes. To ensure the consistency of data, we checked 
the correspondence between the date of IPOs on Zephyr and the first available monthly 
price observations in Datastream. Some IPOs were excluded for having revealed 
inconsistencies. Panels A and B of table 2 lists the firms by their size-and-book-to-
market ratios, respectively, splitting the IPOs by IPOs with warrants and IPOs without 
warrants. As we can see in the third column of panel A, the firms that issued IPOs 
between 2000 and 2011 tend to have a similar market value. Table 2 shows that 39,28% 
of firms that issued IPOs are in the first deciles and the other 39,29% firms are in the 
highest decile. Understanding which type of IPOs have more impact in this fact, we 
conclude that the firms that issued IPOs with warrants had a higher contribution for the 
increase of firms with high market value. Almost 44% of IPOs with warrants firms are 
concentrated in the largest decile, against 36% of IPOs without warrants firms. This 
conclusion is different from conclusions obtained by Mazouz et al. (2008a) that 
analyzed the IPOs in the Hong-Kong Stock Exchange, between 1990 and 2002. They 
conclude that firms that issued IPOs with warrants have a lower market value. In their 
study only 15,33% of IPOs with warrants firms are concentrated in the largest decile. 
Thus, we can conclude that the type of firms issuing IPOs with warrants have been 
changing, emerging large companies using warrants in their IPOs. 
Analysing panel B, it is notorious that a significant number of IPOs firms (41,07%) are 
concentrated in the largest decile revealing better book-to-market ratios comparing with 
the value (8,94%) obtained by Mazouz et al. (2008a). Analysing separately the firms 
that issued IPOs with warrants and IPOs without warrants, we can verify that firms that 
issued IPOs without warrants have better book-to-market ratios. Nevertheless, it is 
important to mention that 34,78% of firms that issued IPOs with warrants have a higher 
market value than the firms that issued IPOs with warrants in the Hong-Hong Stock 
Exchange in the last century (9,75%). This result leads us to believe that in the last 
years the type of firms using warrants in their IPOs have been changing, so these 
companies present a greater dimension. Thus, the distribution of IPOs with warrants is 
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less consistent with the predictions of the agency costs and signalling models that argue 
that warrants are used by smaller firms in their initial equity offerings. 
Panel C shows the industry distribution of our sample. The mining industry leads the 
number of IPOs with warrants, providing a clear indication of industry clustering in the 
British markets. This fact is not a surprise for us, once the United Kingdom has the most 
important Stock Exchanges of metals in the world. In other way, these numbers reveal 
that companies that have projects in areas with higher uncertainty, as is the case of 
mining industries, use warrants in initial equity offerings to provide more confidence to 
investors. Moreover, in the analysed period, companies with specific SIC codes from 
manufacturing companies and finance, insurance and real estate companies issued more 
IPOs with warrants than IPOs without warrants. The same did not happen for service 
companies, once, in the analysed period, this industry issued twenty-five IPOs without 
warrants against only two IPOs with warrants. These results are different from the 
results of other authors like Schultz (1993) and Lee et al. (2003) that considered the 
services industry as the industry with greater number of IPOs with warrants. Curiously, 
the results of Lee et al. (2003) showed that industries including mining, fishing, 
farming, transportation, construction, and financial services are the industries with less 
IPOs with warrants, in other words, the opposite of our results. However, a recent study 
of Mazouz et al. (2008a) reveals results more similar to ours, with the manufacturing 
industry leading the type of industry that issued more IPOs with warrants and the 
services firms opting to issue IPOs without warrants instead of IPOs with warrants. The 
mining industry does not have significant results in their study, maybe because the 
Hong-Kong Stock Exchange is not a reference in the price of metals, contrary to the 
London Stock Exchange, for example. The transportation and public utilities industry 
registered only one IPO with warrants. These conclusions are consistent with the 
agency costs and signalling models that predict some degree of industry clustering for 
IPOs with warrants, once the warrants are used in IPOs when the future cash flows are 
relatively uncertain leading to a systematic variation of viability of investment 
opportunities across industries (Schultz, 1993). 
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3.2. Control samples 
Bearing in mind that the study aims to analyze the robustness of the performance of 
IPOs with warrants, we decided to compare systematically their returns to those of a set 
of control firms. Following the previous studies of Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter 
(1995), Eckbo and Norli (2005) and Mazouz et al. (2008a), these firms were matched 
on both size, size-and-book-to-market ratio and industry-size-and-book-to-market ratio. 
Size-matched firms were selected from all companies listed on the United Kingdom 
Stock Exchanges and publicly listed before their correspondent IPO firms. According to 
the criteria used to define the list of IPOs without warrants, we only chose companies 
with SIC codes belonging to the group of SIC codes from companies that issued IPOs 
with warrants. From these set of preselected companies, the size-matched firms are the 
non-IPOs firms closest in market capitalization to the companies that are analyzed. The 
IPOs firms’ market capitalization is based on the first month available market 
capitalization on Datastream, after the offering date. When matching is based on the 
size-and-book-to-market ratio, the criterion is the selection of companies that have 
equity market values within 30% of the equity market value of the issuer from the set of 
firms above-mentioned. After that, this subset is ranked according to book-to-market 
ratios that are closest to the IPOs firms. In the industry-size-and-market-to-book-ratio 
matching, the matched firms are selected following the same method of the size-and-
book-to-market ratio, adding the criterion that these non-IPOs firms must reveal the 
same SIC Code of the IPOs firms. 
Table 3 shows the size-and-book-to-market ratios of the IPOs firms and their matched 
pairs. Once the analyzed sample did not show normality and homogeneity we used a 
non-parametric test, although some literature argues that parametric tests are robust to 
the violation of the normality assumption, since the size of samples is not extremely 
small (n<30) (Refinetti, 1996). So, we used the test of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
suitable to compare the medians of two independent populations. Thus, we compare the 
medians of each matched firms portfolios with the portfolios of initial public offerings. 
The size and book-to-market ratios of all IPOs is not significantly different from the 
values of their size-matched firms. The differences increase when the comparison is 
made with the other matched firms. The IPOs with warrants and IPOs without warrants 
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show the same trend, with exception to the value of book-to-market ratios that differ for 
all matched firms, including the size-matched firms. Analyzing directly the differences 
between IPOs with warrants and IPOs without warrants, it is notorious that firms that 
issued IPOs without warrants are greater than IPOs with warrants, confirming the 
conclusions of Schultz (1993) and Byoun and Moore (2003) that these firms are smaller 
and younger. Relatively to the market-to-book-value ratios, the IPOs firms are 
significantly higher than their matched firms, especially the size-matched firms. Our 
results are a little different from the results of Mazouz et al. (2008a). They did not find 
significant differences in the correspondence of IPOs with all their matched firms with 
regard to their size. Nevertheless, the book-to-market ratios between their IPOs and 
matched firms have the same trend. Therefore, we must agree with their conclusion that 
the difference in book-to-market ratios between IPOs and their matched firms calls for 
the use of other methods to better account for firms’ characteristics. 
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Table 3 - Size-and-book-to-market characteristics of the IPOs firms and their non-issuing control firms.  
This table describes the size and book-to-market characteristics of the 56 analyzed firms that went public in United Kingdom between 2000 and 2011 and their non-issuing 
control firms matched on size, size-and-book-to-market ratio, and industry-size-and-book-to-market ratio. The firms were selected from all companies, with the same SIC Code 
of IPOs with warrants firms, listed on United Kingdom Stock Exchanges and publicly listed before their correspondent IPO firms. The size-matched firms are the non-IPOs firm 
closest in market capitalization to the IPOs firms. The size-and-book-to market matched firms are selected from the firms that have equity market values within 30% of the 
equity market value of issuer. After that, this subset is ranked according to book-to-market ratios closest to the IPOs firms. The industry-size-and-market-to-book ratio matching 
following the same method, with the restriction that the non-IPOs firm belongs to the same industry as the IPOs firm. Market value is the share price multiplied by the number 
of ordinary shares in issue based on the first month available market capitalization on the Datastream, after the offering date. The amount in issue is updated whenever new 
tranches of stock are issued or after a capital change. Market value is displayed in millions of units of local currency. Book to market ratio is defined as the balance sheet value 
of the ordinary (common) equity divided by the market value of the ordinary (common) equity in the company. 
The results were automatically obtained by SPSS. 
* indicate significance at 1%. 
 
 
IPOs 
Matched Firms      
 Size matched p-Value Size and b/m matched p-Value Industry, size and b/m matched p-Value 
Panel A: All IPOs        
Average size 50,29 50,28 0,980 42,18 0,202 39,46 0,073* 
Average book-to-market-value 5,85 5,32 0,077* 4,99 0,303 5,98 0,302 
 
IPOs  
 
Matched Firms 
    
 Size matched p-Value Size and b/m matched p-Value Industry, size and b/m matched p-Value 
Panel B: IPOs with warrants        
Average size 16,09 16,39 0,955 39,55 0,161 37,16 0,075* 
Average book-to-market-value 6,58 3,74 0,486 5,32 0,217 3,95 0,144 
 
IPOs 
Matched Firms 
 
 
    
 Size matched p-Value Size and b/m matched p-Value Industry, size and b/m matched p-Value 
Panel C: IPOs without warrants        
Average size 74,13 74,37 0,919 43,93 0,760 41,02 0,437 
Average book-to-market-value 6,74 5,32 0,103 4,73 0,716 7,39 0,852 
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4. Methodology and results 
Following very closely the methodology of Mazouz et al. (2008a), in this section we 
present the three main models referred in literature to analyse the long-term 
performance of IPOs: the event-time approach and the calendar-time and matched 
calendar-time regressions. The event-time approach uses a variety of methods for 
measuring long-term abnormal returns, suggesting that initial public offerings 
underperform the market index. However, this model is very debated in literature and to 
mitigate the biases associated with the use of the event-time approach, we use a 
standard calendar-time regression that suggests significantly negative abnormal returns 
for both type of IPOs only when the equally weighted returns are used. To better control 
for firm size and book-to-market characteristics, we also used the matched calendar-
time factor regression. 
4.1. Event-time abnormal returns 
Abnormal returns are the crucial measure to assess the impact of an event. The general 
idea of this measure is to isolate the effect of the event from other general market 
movements. In event-study analyses, two different measures of aggregated abnormal 
returns are often used to measure the long-term price performance: the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) and/or the buy-and-hold-returns (BHAR). For robustness 
purposes, we used both. The samples of all IPOs, with and without warrants, were 
monitored for a 3-year period after issuance. To measure the abnormal returns 
associated with our samples of IPOs firms, we followed Mazouz et al. (2008a) and 
Cheng (2005) and used the event-induced average cumulative abnormal return (𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
and the event-induced average buy-and-hold return (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). The three-year 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  are computed as described in equations (1) and (2) and 𝑤𝑖 is the weight on the 
firm I and N is the number of firms. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1   (1) 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  (2) 
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For any abnormal average returns, we also calculated different portfolios based on 
equally-weighted and value-weighted returns. The equally weighted (EW) returns were 
obtained dividing each value by the total number of observations, 𝜔𝑖 = 1/𝑁, providing 
an equal weight for each firm. The value-weighted (VW) returns, 𝜔1 = 𝑀𝑉𝑖/𝑀𝑉 , 
provide a more measured weight where 𝑀𝑉𝑖 is the issuer’s common stock market value 
at the end of the event month and 𝑀𝑉 = Σ𝑖𝑀𝑉𝑖. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1 − 𝑅𝐵,𝑡) (3) 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1 ) −  ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝐵,𝑡)
𝑁
𝑡=1       (4) 
Equations (3) and (4) show how to estimate the firm’s i event-induced cumulative 
abnormal returns (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖) and event-induced buy-and-hold returns (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖), where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
is the monthly return of an event firm i in month t and 𝑅𝐵,𝑡 is the monthly return of a 
benchmark firm or portfolio3. Such as Mazouz et al. (2008a), we measured the long-
term performance of the event firms with respect to various benchmarks, testing the 
robustness of our results. In these benchmarks, we included a value-weighted market 
index (MSCI United Kingdom) and non-event firms matched with the event firm on 
size, size-and-book-to-market ratio, and industry-size-and-book-to-market ratio. The 
MSCI United Kingdom is an index of Morgan Stanley Capital International designed to 
measure the performance of the large and mid cap segments of the UK market. With 
111 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market 
capitalization in the UK. This index was carefully selected, once the index reinvests the 
dividends instead of distributing them by their subscribers. This was an essential 
condition for choosing the index because we also considered the dividend distribution 
of firms in the calculation of their returns. To determine the statistical significance of 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , we also used the adjusted t-statistic by Brown and Warner (1980) and 
Brown and Warner (1985) and the skewness-adjusted t-statistic by Lyon et al. (1999), 
respectively4. All tests were made considering the null hypothesis equal to zero. It is 
usual to use zero according to literature, but we also used this value considering that in 
                                                        
3 The returned of equity was computed as 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑛((𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖,𝑡)/(𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1)), where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the monthly 
return of an event firm i in month t, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡  is the price of stock firm in moment t, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡  is the dividend 
distributed by shareholders of firm I in month t and 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is the price of stock firm in moment t-1.  
4 Detailed explanations of these significance tests are in the appendix 2 and 3. 
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efficient markets the real value of firms must be considered in the stock exchange 
quotation, so abnormal returns should not exist. 
Table 4 shows the average CARs generated from using the market index and matched 
firms as reference portfolios. Panel A suggests that the equally-weighted CARs depend 
largely on the type of IPO and choice of benchmarks. When the benchmark is the size-
matched firms, the IPOs with warrants (-0,02%) have a better performance than IPOs 
without warrants (-1,70%). However, the opposite happens with the other benchmark, 
especially when the industry is the factor of matching, once the difference between the 
performance of IPOs with warrants and IPOs without warrants is greater (-3,49% and -
0,92%, respectively). The IPOs have a trend to underperform any matched portfolio and 
the opposite does not happen with the index of market as benchmark. Moreover, 
comparing with the index performance, the differences are even more significant. The 
IPOs with warrants underperform the market in -4,45%, while IPOs without warrants 
are slightly better but still negative (-3,95%).  
Panel B presents the three-year value-weighted CARs. In this panel, it is possible to 
conclude that when the cumulative abnormal return is computed in a value-weighted 
form, the results improve considerably. For example, this time the performance of IPOs 
is positive when matched with any non-IPOs firms. Curiously, and comparing with the 
market index, the IPOs with warrants have a positive performance (0,21%) with a 
considerable statistical significance, while the performance of IPOs without warrants 
improved significantly, although it is still negative (-0,13%). Analysing the set of all 
IPOs, their values are always an intermediate value between the values of IPOs with 
warrants and IPOs without warrants. This fact can be related with the size of samples 
and the fact that only ten observations separate the total number of IPOs with warrants 
(23 firms) and IPOs without warrants (33 firms). Having the care to understand the 
difference of performance between IPOs with warrants and IPOs without warrants, we 
decided to compare them, using again the non-parametric test of Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney. Panel C shows these results, differentiating the equally-weighted portfolio 
from the value-weighted portfolio.  In the equally-weighted portfolio, the IPOs with 
warrants have worse performance than IPOs without warrants. However, the same does 
not happen when we are analyzing the value-weighted portfolios, where performance of 
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Table 4 - Three-year average cumulative abnormal return (𝑪𝑨𝑹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) for the sample firms. 
 
 N 
Market Index Matched Firms     
 
 
Market Index Size  Size-and-book-to-market  Industry-size-and-book-to-market  
 Mean CAR p-Value Mean CAR p-Value Mean CAR p-Value Mean CAR p-Value 
p-Value 
 
Panel A: equally-weighted portfolios 
 
All IPOs 56 -2,12% 0,000*** -0,60% 0,204 -0,22% 0,595 -1,01% 0,012** 
IPOs with warrants 23 -4,45% 0,001*** -0,02% 0,990 -1,13% 0,516 -3,49% 0,015** 
IPOs without warrants 33 -3,95% 0,000*** -1,70% 0,098* -0,26% 0,775 -0,92% 0,340 
 
Panel B: value-weighted portfolios 
 
All IPOs 
 
56 
 
-0,05% 0,011** 0,73% 0,737 1,14% 0,856 1,01% 0,115 
IPOs with warrants 23 0,21% 0,045** 6,80% 0,445 2,17% 0,870 1,33% 0,170 
IPOs without warrants 33 -0,13% 0,074* 0,08% 0,874 1,98% 0,888 2,01% 0,634 
 
 N Market Index Size Size-and-book-to-market Industry-size-and-book-to-market 
 
 
Mean CAR p-Valueª Mean CAR p-Valueª Mean CAR p-Valueª Mean CAR p-Valueª 
Panel C: IPOs with warrants versus IPOs without warrants 
 
Equally weighted-portfolios 
IPOs with warrants 23 -4,45% 0,358 -0,02% 0,223 -1,13% 0,239 -3,49% 0,072* 
IPOs without warrants 33 -3,95%  -1,70%  -0,26%  -0,92%  
 
Value weighted-portfolios 
IPOs with warrants 23 0,21% 0,164 6,80% 0,276 2,17% 0,358 1,33% 0,152 
IPOs without warrants 33 -0,13%  0,08%  1,99%  2,01%  
This table reports the 3-year post-IPO average cumulative abnormal return (𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). The 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is calculated as 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = ∑ (𝑤𝑖𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1 , where 𝑤𝑖 is the weight on firm i and N is 
the number of securities. The cumulative abnormal average returns were calculated using equally and value-weighted returns. The equally weighted (EW) returns were obtained 
dividing each value by the total number of observations, 𝜔𝑖 = 1/𝑁, providing an equal weight for each firm. The value-weighted (VW) returns, 𝜔1 = 𝑀𝑉𝑖/𝑀𝑉, provide a more 
measured weight where 𝑀𝑉𝑖 is the issuer`s common stock market value at the end of the event month and 𝑀𝑉 = Σ𝑖𝑀𝑉𝑖. The stock i’s event-induced cumulative abnormal return 
(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖) is estimated as 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1 − 𝑅𝐵,𝑡) where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly return of an firm i in month t and 𝑅𝐵,𝑡is the monthly return of benchmark or portfolios. Benchmarks 
are based on market index and on non-IPOs firms matched on size, size-and-book-to-market ratio, and industry-size-and-book-to-market ratio. 
ª Realized with the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test. 
The results were automatically obtained by SPSS. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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IPOs with warrants are greater than performance of IPOs without warrants, regardless 
of the benchmark used. In a comprehensive manner it is possible to conclude that 
equally-weighted CARs provide evidence of the underperformance of IPOs with 
warrants. When matching is based on industry-size-and-book-to-market ratio, the value-
weighted CARs do not provide evidence of statistical significance. The results of 
equally-weighted CARs do not support the predictions of both agency costs and 
signaling models. These conclusions meet the findings of Mazouz et al. (2008a) that do 
not support the predictions of the models above-mentioned. Their average CARs results 
reveal a level of underperformance much higher than our values.  
Table 5 shows the average BHARs generated from using the market index and matched 
firms as reference portfolios. Similar to the results of table 4, Panel A also suggests that 
the equally-weighted BHARs depend on the type of IPO and choice of benchmarks. In 
this panel all type of IPOs underperform the matched firms and especially the market 
index (-1,16%, -2,77% and -1,98%, respectively) with a high statistical significance. In 
another way, the results are more positive when the value-weight portfolios are 
analysed, in spite of the underperformance of IPOs with warrants (-0,42%) when 
compared with the market index. In other matched portfolios, IPOs with warrants and 
IPOs without warrants have positive performance with good levels of statistical 
significance across them. For example, when IPOs with warrants are compared with the 
size-and-book-to-market ratio firms in value-weight portfolios, these IPOs have a 
greater performance than IPOs without warrants. Panel C shows the differences 
between IPOs with warrants and IPOs without warrants in both weighted portfolios. 
Neither in equally-weighted portfolios nor in value-weighted portfolios are firms of 
IPOs with warrants better than firms that issue IPOs without warrants. Comparing our 
results with the study of Mazouz et al. (2008a), our study shows the same trend, except 
when they compared both types of IPOs with industry-size-and-book-to-market 
matched firms in value-weighted portfolios. In a general way, it is important to refer 
that the fact of value-weighted returns being much greater than equally-weighted returns 
suggests that the equally-weighted mean BHAR is driven by small-firm stocks. We also 
conclude that the underperformance of IPOs with warrants compared to that of IPOs 
without warrants is not consistent with agency costs and signaling explanations.  
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Table 5 - Three-year average abnormal return (𝑩𝑯𝑨𝑹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) for the sample firms. 
 
 
This table reports the 3-year post-IPO average buy and hold return (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). The 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is calculated as 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = ∑ (𝑤𝑖𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1 , where 𝑤𝑖 is the weight on firm i and N is 
the number of securities. The cumulative abnormal average returns were calculated using equally and value-weighted returns. The equally weighted (EW) returns were 
obtained dividing each value by the total number of observations, 𝜔𝑖 = 1/𝑁, providing an equal weight for each firm. The value-weighted (VW) returns, 𝜔1 = 𝑀𝑉𝑖/𝑀𝑉, 
provide a more measured weight where 𝑀𝑉𝑖 is the issuer`s common stock market value at the end of the event month and 𝑀𝑉 = Σ𝑖𝑀𝑉𝑖 . The stock i’s event-induced 
cumulative abnormal return (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖) is estimated as 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1 ) − ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝐵,𝑡)
𝑁
𝑡=1 , where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly return of an event firm i in month t and 𝑅𝐵,𝑡is 
the monthly return of benchmark or portfolios. Benchmarks are based on market index and on non-IPOs firms matched on size, size-and-book-to-market ratio, and industry-
size-and-book-to-market ratio. 
ª Realized with the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test. 
The results were automatically obtained by SPSS. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 N 
Market Index Matched Firms     
 
 
Market Index Size  Size-and-book-to-market  Industry-size-and-book-to-market  
 
 
Mean 
BHAR 
p-Value Mean 
BHAR 
p-Value Mean 
BHAR 
p-Value Mean 
BHAR 
p-Value 
Panel A: equally-weighted portfolios 
 
All IPOs 56 -1,16% 0,000*** -0,21% 0,318 -0,23% 0,328 -0,38% 0,045** 
IPOs with warrants 23 -2,77% 0,001*** -0,02% 0,021** -0,89% 0,665 -1,29% 0,064* 
IPOs without warrants 33 -1,98% 0,000*** -0,59% 0,054* -0,28% 0,030** -0,28% 0,012** 
 
Panel B: value-weighted portfolios 
 
All IPOs 
 
56 0,14% 0,000*** 0,81% 0,425 0,91% 0,034** 0,73% 0,019** 
IPOs with warrants 23 -0,42% 0,020** 4,08% 0,000*** 0,77% 0,622 0,56% 0,075* 
IPOs without warrants 33 0,35% 0,001*** 1,07% 0,063** 1,72% 0,004*** 1,51% 0,024** 
 
 N 
Market Index Size  Size-and-book-to-market Industry-size-and-book-to-market 
 
 
Mean 
BHAR 
p-Valueª Mean 
BHAR 
p-Valueª Mean 
BHAR 
p-Valueª Mean 
BHAR 
p-Valueª 
Panel C: IPOs with warrants versus IPOs without warrants 
 
Equally-weighted portfolios 
IPOs with warrants 23 -2,77% 0,032** 0,02% 0,402 -0,89% 0,084* -1,29% 0,023** 
IPOs without warrants 33 -1,98%  -0,59%  -0,28%  -0,28%  
 
Value-weighted portfolios 
IPOs with warrants 23 
23 
-0,42% 0,173 4,08% 0,204 0,77% 0,160 0,56% 0,051* 
IPOs without warrants 3  0,35%  1,07%  1,72%  1,51%  
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4.2. Standard calendar-time regressions 
The event-time approach above mentioned is often used to analyse the long-term 
performance of IPOs. However, this model is very debated in literature and to mitigate 
the biases associated with the use of the event-time approach, we use a standard 
calendar-time regression. According to Fama (1998), this regression eliminates the 
problem originated by the event-time approach, which overstates the statistical 
inference and does not control the correlation among individual firms. Thus, and like 
Mazouz et al. (2008a) we test the performance of a given portfolio beyond the level of 
which common risk factors can capture and automatically account for the cross-
correlation of event firms in the portfolio variance.  
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) +  𝛼2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡(5) 
The equation (5) above mentioned is the based formula of employed regression, where 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 is the monthly return of the portfolio of event firms; 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the monthly return of 
the one-month United Kingdom Interbank Borrowing Rate (LIBOR) and  𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the 
monthly return of the market index (MSCI United Kingdom). The 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus 
big) and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  (high minus low) are the difference between the monthly returns of 
value-weighted portfolios of small big stocks and high and low book-to-market 
portfolios, respectively. The values of 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  used in our regression were 
obtained in the Fama and French5 site that computed this value for different regions of 
the world. We considered the values of European portfolios, assuming similarity 
between markets and firms across all Europe. Such as Eckbo and Norli (2005) and 
Mazouz et al. (2008a) we decided to include the 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡, a momentum factor. The value 
of 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  was also collected in the site of Fama and French and is computed as the 
average return on the two high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the 
two low prior return portfolios. These portfolios are constructed as the intersections of 
two portfolios formed on the market value of equity (size) and three portfolios formed 
on the prior 12-month returns. The intercept, 𝛼0 , measures the average monthly 
abnormal return of the portfolio event firms. 
                                                        
5 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html 
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Before employing the regression, we also organized the data considering the beginning 
of each month to form an equally and a value-weight portfolio of firms that issue IPOs 
within the previous 3 years. In order to ensure the exit of firms that passed the 3-year 
period and the entry of new firms, we rebalanced our portfolios monthly. Lastly we 
decided not to use a linear regression and, following Mazouz et al. (2008a), we applied 
a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression. Thus, we wanted to avoid some problems 
of linear regressions as the standard deviation of the error term being constant over all 
values of the predictor or explanatory variables. With a WLS regression we have the 
advantage of this model being an efficient method that makes good use of small data 
sets with ability to handle regression situations in which the data points are of varying 
quality. The results from WLS estimation of standard calendar-time regressions are 
reported in table 6. 
These results show that under the standard calendar-time regression, the equally 
weighted portfolios generate statistically significant mean abnormal returns of -3,5%, -
3,6% and -3,5% for all IPOs, IPOs with and without warrants, respectively. The 
intercept of IPOs with warrants is slightly higher than the intercept of IPOs without 
warrants. This fact also occurred in the study of Mazouz et al. (2008a) and can be 
related with two possible explanations. First, the negative abnormal performance has 
more prominence in small firms, while value-weighted portfolio returns are more 
directed to big firms (Loughran and Ritter, 2000). Fama (1998) and Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) give us the second explanation related with the fact that, in a sample 
mostly with different-size firms (small or high growth firms), there is a high probability 
to over reject the null hypothesis of zero intercept. Curiously, the same does not happen 
in value-weighted portfolios, where the intercept of IPOs with warrants is lower than 
the intercept of IPOs without warrants. However, in value-weighted portfolios, this 
intercept is not statistically significant. Compared with the equally-weighted portfolios, 
the mean abnormal returns of this portfolios are worse for all IPOs returns and IPOs 
without warrants returns (-3,9% and -5%) with significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
Analysing the coefficient of determination (R-square), we can conclude that IPOs with 
warrants in equally-weighted portfolios have the best coefficient revealing that 57,1% 
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Table 6 - The post-issue 3-year abnormal returns from the standard calendar-time factor regressions. 
  0 p-Value 1 p-Value 2 p-Value 3 p-Value 4 p-Value R-square 
Panel A: equally-weighted portfolios 
 
All IPOs -0,035 0,043** 0,837 0,000*** 0,008 0,296 -0,002 0,696 -0,005 0,048** 0,484 
IPOs with warrants -0,036 0,051** 0,755 0,000*** 0,018 0,028** -0,004 0,470 -0,007 0,009*** 0,571 
IPOs without warrants -0,035 0,074* 0,898 0,000*** 0,000 0,947 0,000 0,938 -0,002 0,476 0,425 
 
Panel B: value-weighted portfolios 
 
All IPOs -0,039 0,091* 1,0695 0,000*** -0,001 0,932 0,006 0,467 -0,002 0,631 0,437 
IPOs with warrants -0,022 0,297 0,762 0,000*** 0,009 0,323 0,003 0,694 -0,008 0,030** 0,489 
IPOs without warrants -0,050 0,048** 1,123 0,000*** -0,005 0,594 0,006 0,542 -0,002 0,694 0,425 
This table show the post-issue 3-year abnormal returns from the standard calendar-time factor regressions. The WLS estimation is: 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) +
 𝛼2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, where 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 is the monthly return of the portfolio of event firms; 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the monthly return of one month United Kingdom Interbank 
Borrowing Rate (LIBOR) and  𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the monthly return of market index (MSCI United Kingdom). 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) are the difference 
between the monthly returns of value weighted portfolios of small big stocks and high and low book-to-market portfolios, respectively. 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 is the average return on the two 
high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios. These portfolios are constructed as the intersections of two portfolios formed on 
market value of equity (size) and three portfolios formed on prior 12-month return. The intercept, 𝛼0, measures the average monthly abnormal return of the portfolio event 
firms. The estimations are associated with all IPOs, IPOs with warrants and IPOs without warrants using equally and value-weighted returns. The data was organized 
considering the beginning of each month to form an equally and a value-weight portfolio of firms that issue IPOs within the previous 3 years. All portfolios were rebalanced 
monthly to ensure that firms that reach the end of their 3-year period were excluded and new issues were included. When 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 is computed on a value-weighted basis, the firm 
i’s weight in forming the portfolios is its market value of equity at the end of the previous month.  
The statistical significance is generated after conducting the Park test to evaluate the level of heteroscedasticity.  
The results were automatically obtained by SPSS. 
.***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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of the dependent variable 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡  is explained by the independent variables. The 
other values are slightly below that coefficient, but yet in an intermediate level 6 . 
Considering the remaining variables, only 𝛼1 (difference between the monthly return of 
market index, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 , and the monthly return of the one-month United Kingdom 
Interbank Borrowing Rate, 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) has special contribution for the model with a high level 
of confidence (99%). In the equally weighted-portfolio, 𝛼4 (a momentum factor) also 
has a special contribution, with 99% of confidence, in the explanation of the returns of 
IPOs with warrants. The same happens to all IPOs returns but with less statistical 
significance (95% of confidence). In value-weighted portfolios, 𝛼4  (a momentum 
factor) has again a special feature to IPOs with warrants presenting a significance of 
5%.  
These results are not consistent with the predictions of the agency costs model, once the 
IPOs with warrants do not have a better performance than IPOs without warrants in 
equally-weighted portfolios, and value-weighted portfolios. Thus, these results are not 
consistent with the predictions of the agency costs model, which expects that IPOs with 
warrants have better quality of investments, and consequently higher long-term risk-
adjusted returns than IPOs without warrants.  
4.3. Matched calendar-time regressions 
Mazouz et al. (2008a) argue that, since the IPOs firms are generally small and high-
growth firms, the problem of over-rejecting the null hypothesis is particularly severe. 
Thus, to avoid the over rejection problem associated with the standard calendar-time 
factor regression, we decided to follow Boehme and Sorescu (2002); Cheng (2005) and 
Mazouz et al. (2008a) that recommended the use of a zero-investment calendar-time 
portfolio consisting of long positions on event firms and short positions on the matched 
non-event firms.  
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡        (6) 
                                                        
6The R-square must be between zero and one. When R-square is equal to zero, we can consider that the 
model does not fit the data, while if the R-square is equal to one, the adjustment could be considered 
perfect. 
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This time, 𝑅𝑝,𝑡  is the monthly return of the portfolio of event firms and 𝑅𝑐,𝑡  is the 
monthly return of the matched portfolio of benchmark firms constructed both on an 
equally-weighted and a value-weighted basis. The benchmark firms are matched based 
on size, size-and-book-to-market ratio, and industry-size-and-book-to-market ratio as 
shown in section 3.2. The intercept 𝛽0 is the average monthly abnormal return of the 
portfolio. The remaining items follow the description already mentioned in section 4.2.. 
As Mazouz et al. (2008a), we decided to compare the performance of IPOs with 
warrants and IPOs without warrants through re-estimation of equation six, using the 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 as the monthly returns of the portfolios of IPOs without warrants and 𝑅𝑐,𝑡  as the 
monthly returns of the portfolios of IPOs with warrants. 
Table 7 shows the results of 3-year abnormal returns after issuance that derived from 
the matched calendar-time factor regressions, specifically for size, size-and-book-to-
market ratio and industry-size-and-book-to-market ratio. In this case, the average 
abnormal returns of IPOs in equally-weighted portfolios are positive only for IPOs with 
warrants (1%), when matched with firms by size, but without statistical significance. 
All IPOs and IPOs without warrants analysed separately have underperformance with 
lower statistical significance (10%). The results of value-weighted portfolios have the 
same trend but in this case without any statistical significance. These results are 
different from those of Mazouz et al. (2008a). In their study, in value-weighted 
portfolios, both types of IPOs had a positive performance but without statistical 
significance. Understanding the best independent variables that explain the dependent 
variable (𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑐,𝑡 ) by R-square analysis, it is possible to conclude that in both 
portfolios the IPOs with warrants have best models than the IPOs without warrants. 
When the analysis is based on matched firms by size-and-book-to-market and industry-
size-and-book-to-market ratios, the results of IPOs with warrants are worse. The 
comparison with these matched firms give best performance for IPOs without warrants 
with statistical significance in equally-weighted portfolios. However, the R-square 
analysis reveals a good model for IPOS with warrants when the analysis is compared 
with size-and-book-to-market firms. 
The direct comparison between the performances of IPOs with warrants and IPOs 
without warrants, in the last three columns of table 7, show that the intercept of 
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regression (eq.(6)) is negative, revealing in both portfolios a better performance of IPOs 
with warrants. However, only there is acceptable statistical significance (1%) for value-
weighted portfolios.7 In this section, the results are positive for IPOs with warrants 
compared with IPOs without warrants. These results meet the predictions of the agency 
costs hypothesis and signaling hypothesis. The expected higher long-term risk-adjusted 
returns of IPOs without warrants are obtained. 
                                                        
7 The remaining regression coefficients are presented in appendix 4. 
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Table 7 - The post-issue 3-year abnormal returns from the matched calendar-time factor regressions. 
  
Size match Size-and-book-to-market match Industry-size-and-book-to-market match 
IPOs with warrants vs 
 IPOs without warrants 
  0 p-Value R-square 0 p-Value R-square 0 p-Value R-square 0 p-Value R-square 
Panel B: equally-weighted portfolios 
 
All IPOs -0,023 0,057* 0,062 -0,019 0,286 0,066 -0,20 0,302 0,055    
IPOs with warrants 0,010 0,464 0,046 -0,014 0,524 0,086 -0,030 0,143 0,146 -0,007 0,781 0,047 
IPOs without warrants -0,027 0,097* 0,030 -0,023 0,061* 0,098 -0,031 0,032** 0,094    
 
Panel B: value-weighted portfolios 
 
All IPOs -0,003 0,909 0,011 -0,001 0,970 0,098 -0,16 0,338 0,055    
IPOs with warrants 0,010 0,815 0,053 0,008 0,758 0,180 0,038 0,082* 0,096 -0,062 0,082* 0,166 
IPOs without warrants -0,004 0,794 0,019 0,033 0,154 0,064 0,015 0,424 0,046    
This table show the post-issue 3-year abnormal returns from the matched calendar-time factor regressions.  The WLS estimation is: 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) +
𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡 , where 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 is the monthly return of the portfolio of event firms;𝑅𝑐,𝑡  is the monthly return of the matched portfolio of benchmark 
firms,𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the monthly return of one month United Kingdom Interbank Borrowing Rate (LIBOR) and  𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the monthly return of market index (MSCI United Kingdom). 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) are the difference between the monthly returns of value weighted portfolios of small big stocks and high and low book-
to-market portfolios, respectively. 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡is the average return on the two high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios. These 
portfolios are constructed as the intersections of two portfolios formed on market value of equity (size) and three portfolios formed on prior 12-month return. The intercept β0 
is the average monthly abnormal return of the portfolio that specifically corrects for (i) size, (ii) size-and-book-to-market ratio, and (iii) industry, size-and-book-to-market 
ratio. The remaining items follow the description already mentioned in section 3.2. The estimations are associated with all IPOs, IPOs with warrants and IPOs without 
warrants using equally and value-weighted returns. The data was organized considering the beginning of each month to form an equally and a value-weight portfolio of firms 
that issue IPOs within the previous 3 years. All portfolios were rebalanced monthly to ensure that firms that reach the end of their 3-year period were excluded and new issues 
were included. When 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 is computed on a value-weighted basis, the firm i’s weight in forming the portfolios is its market value of equity at the end of the previous month.  
The statistical significance is generated after conducting the Park test to evaluate the level of heteroscedasticity.  
The results were automatically obtained by SPSS. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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6. Conclusions 
The main purpose of this study was to understand if the agency costs and signalling 
hypotheses explain the reason to include warrants in IPOs, using the long-term price 
performance approach. Studying the IPOs with warrants issued in the United Kingdom 
after the year of 2000, we also analysed the type of firms that opted for this kind of 
strategy. Literature argues that these firms present future projects, which are difficult to 
evaluate on the basis of the current available information. So, these firms use warrants 
as a signal to differentiate themselves from bad firms. For Schultz (1993), these firms 
are smaller, younger and mainly from high-tech or services industries. In the same way, 
they are more likely to fail than firms that issue only shares in IPOs.  
We found results that contradict some predictions of the agency costs model and the 
conclusions of Schultz (1993) above mentioned. We conclude that firms that issued 
IPOs with warrants in the United Kingdom had a higher contribution for the increase of 
firms with high market value compared with firms of IPOs without warrants. This fact 
leads us to believe that the type of firms issuing IPOs with warrants have been changing 
and large companies from industries until then characterized by the non-use of warrants 
in their IPOs have emerged. As an example, we can highlight the mining industries and 
manufacturing industries as the main industries using IPOs with warrants against 
services firms that prefer IPOs without warrants. Possible explanations can be related 
with the fact that these firms are using the warrants as mechanism of confidence to 
attract new investors, ensuring flexibility and a constant re-evaluation of their projects. 
These conclusions are in line with the conclusion that Mazouz et al. (2008a) obtained 
after analyzing the firms that issue IPOs with warrants in the Hong-Kong Stock 
Exchange. Perhaps, companies start seeing warrants as an important instrument to 
obtain financing at lower costs. 
Using an approach different from most previous studies and following very closely the 
methodology of Mazouz et al. (2008a), we decided to compare the long-term price 
performance of these firms with firms that did not use warrants in IPOs. Trying to make 
an analysis more focused on the direct comparison of the same industry companies, we 
only used non-IPOs firms that have a SIC code that is encompassed in the group of SIC 
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codes from firms that issued IPOs with warrants. That way, we present results based on 
a more precise case study, which differentiates us from the study of Mazouz et al. 
(2008a). All results were compared with the returns of a set of control non-IPO firms, 
listed in the United Kingdom Stock Exchanges and matched on both size, size-and-
book-to-market ratio and industry-size-and-book-to-market ratio. Our event study of 
cumulative abnormal returns presents worse results for IPOs with warrants in equally-
weighted portfolios than in value-weighted portfolios, with a higher statistical 
significance when matched with the market index. These results do not support those 
obtained by Mazouz et al. (2008a), once their firms underperform the market when 
analyzed in value-weighted portfolios. However, our results show that IPOs with 
warrants underperform the IPOs with warrants when matched with industry-size-and-
book-to-market non-IPOs firms, with 10% of statistical significance. Thus, the results 
do not support the agency costs and signaling models. The results of buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns are also not consistent with the agency costs and signaling models, 
once the IPOs with warrants underperform the market. On the other hand, IPOs without 
warrants have a positive performance in value-weighted portfolios. It is important to say 
that the same does not happen when the benchmark firms are matched on size. In this 
situation, the IPOs with warrants have a positive performance when compared with the 
performance of IPOs without warrants. Comparing directly IPOs with and without 
warrants, we obtained a worse performance for firms that used warrants in equally and 
value-weighted portfolios whenever there is an acceptable level of statistical 
significance. 
By standard calendar-time regression, we concluded that the monthly averages of 
abnormal returns of the portfolio event firms are slightly worse for IPOs with warrants 
than IPOs without warrants in equally-weighted portfolios. These results are also not 
consistent with the predictions of the agency costs model. The same does not happen 
when the analysis is based on value-weighted portfolios but without statistical 
significance to support our conclusion. In matched calendar-time regressions the results 
follow the same trend (positive performance but without statistical significance) in both 
portfolios. Nevertheless the direct comparison between the performances of IPOs with 
warrants and IPOs without warrants reveals that in value-weighted portfolios, IPOs with 
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warrants have a better performance with an acceptable statistical significance. So, these 
results meet the prediction of the agency costs and signaling theories. 
In general, we can state that our results show some evidences that support the agency 
cost and signaling hypotheses. The differences in results and respective conclusions are 
related with the type of portfolio used. However, and comparing directly both type of 
IPOs in value-weighted matched calendar-time regression, we have sufficient statistical 
significance to argue the success of warrants in initial public offerings.  
This success can be explained by many factors, perhaps related with the profile of 
British investors and their expectations or with the fact that firms are taking real 
advantage of warrants in initial public offerings. In our study it is even possible to see 
that in the United Kingdom large companies are using warrants in their IPOs not 
worrying about the fact that this type of operation is associated with small and riskier 
firms. Most importantly, this study launches again the discussion around this topic and 
reveals that although it has been insufficiently studied, it cannot be completely 
disregarded. It discloses increasingly important indications to study and analyze new 
forms of capital funding in a world progressively filled with start-up firms that 
sometimes do not survive because they do not take advantage of the (un)efficiency of 
capital markets.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 – Graph with distribution of the sample, 2000-2011. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 - Adjusted t-Statistic 
Brown and Warner (1980) show that the ajusted t-Statistic is robust to an event-induced 
variance increase. The ajusted t-Statistic was obtained in site of event study metrics and 
is defined as: 
Tcross =
CAAR(T1,T2)
σ̂CAAR (T1,T2)
  (A1) 
Under the null hypothesis, the cumulative average abnormal return is equal to zero. The 
variance estimator of this statistic is based on the cross-section of abnormal returns. 
σ̂2 CAAR(T1, T2) =
1
(N−d)
∑ [CARi(T1. T2) − CAARi(T1, T2)]
2N
i=1   (A1.1) 
Appendix 3 - Skewness-adjusted t-Statistic 
According to Lyon et al. (1999), long-term buy and hold abnormal returns are positively 
skewed and consistently lead to negatively biased t-statistics. To eliminate the skewness 
bias we use the skewness-adjusted t-test. Originally developed by Johnson (1978), is a 
transformed version of the usual t-test. The test statistic for the null hypothesis that the 
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mean buy-and-hold abnormal return is equal to zero is: 
TSkewness−Ajusted = √N [S +
1
3
φS2 +
1
6N
φ  (A2) 
where, 
S =
BHAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(T1,T2)
σ̂BHAR
 (A2.1) 
and, 
φ =
∑ [BHARi(T1,T2)−BHAR(T1,T2)]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
3n
i=1
Nσ̂3BHAR
  (A2.2) 
Since √NSis the usual t-statistic the estimated standard deviation is defined by: 
σ̂BHAR = √
1
N−1
∑ [BHARi(T1, T2) − BHAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (T1, T2)]
2N
i=1  (A2.3) 
Appendix 4 – Remaining regression coefficients of re-estimation of equation six. 
Analysing the remaining coefficients of the regression we can conclude that all of them 
have statistical significance, being 𝛽1  the coefficient that more contributed for the 
model with high level of confidence. 
 
